科学学与科学技术管理

科学学与科学技术管理 ›› 2024, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (04): 173-194.

• 科技人力资源管理 • 上一篇    

管理者短视主义抑制人才政策的创新激励效应了吗？

  

  1. 重庆邮电大学 经济管理学院，重庆 400065
  • 收稿日期:2022-06-08 出版日期:2024-04-10 发布日期:2024-04-28
  • 通讯作者: 李林，lilin@cqupt.edu.cn
  • 作者简介:朱浩（1989— ），男，汉族，四川巴中人，重庆邮电大学经济管理学院副教授，博士，研究方向：技术创新与创新政策； 李林（1969— ），男，汉族，四川安岳人，重庆邮电大学教授，博士，研究方向：企业创新与产业经济；章璐璐（1988— ），女，汉 族，江苏如皋人，重庆邮电大学经济管理学院讲师，博士，研究方向：科技人才管理；何建洪（1973— ），男，汉族，重庆长寿人， 重庆邮电大学经济管理学院教授，博士，研究方向：创新型企业。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社科基金项目（21CGL005）；教育部人文社科基金项目（20YJC630240，20XJC630011）；重庆市教委科学技术研究 项目（KJQN202000643）

Does Managerial Myopia Restrain the Innovation Incentive Effect of Talent Policy?

  1. School of Economics and Management, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing 400065, China
  • Received:2022-06-08 Online:2024-04-10 Published:2024-04-28

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摘要： 人才是创新第一资源，如何在企业层面完善激励体系和营造良好环境以充分激发人才创新活力，是深入实施新时 代人才强国战略的重要现实课题。人才政策作为政府创新激励政策体系中专用性人力资本投资，能否有效激励企业高 质量创新仍然缺乏足够的经验证据。基于信号理论、高层梯队和时间导向理论，以 2008—2020 年中国 A 股上市公司为 样本，从披露的政府补助明细中分离人才补助，采用机器学习技术构建管理者短视主义指标，实证检验人才政策的创新 激励效应和管理者短视主义对人才政策创新激励效应的调节作用。结果发现：人才政策具备较强的创新激励效应，能 有效促进企业高质量创新；但与此同时，企业管理者短视主义显著抑制了人才政策的创新激励效应，上述结论在一系列 稳健性检验后依然成立；进一步从股权结构和管理层治理两个维度的异质性分析表明，监督型机构投资者、股权制衡 度、管理层金融背景和股权激励均有助于缓解管理者短视主义抑制作用。

关键词: 人才政策, 管理者短视主义, 企业创新, 激励效应

Abstract: Innovation-driven is essentially talent-driven. How to improve the incentive system and create a good environment to fully stimulate the innovation vitality of talents is an important practical topic for the in-depth implementation of talents strategy for powerful nation in the new era. In the practice of China's innovation-driven development, the government has successively introduced a package of incentives for technological innovation with financial and tax support as the core. Among these, there is still a lack of sufficient empirical evidence on the effectiveness of talent policy as a dedicated government investment in human capital, directly targeting the most scarce factor of talent production for firm innovation, to stimulate quality innovation in firms. At the same time, the upper echelon theories and time-oriented theories point out that enterprise managers subjectively pay more attention to the short term and prefer the present, and generally produce managerial myopia, distort and worsen the internal innovation environment of enterprises, which in turn may inhibit the effective functioning of government incentives. However, at present, there is a lack of direct empirical evidence from academia on whether managerial myopia negatively moderates the innovation incentive effect of government incentive policies, especially talent policies, which provides room for a marginal contribution to this paper, which will help explore feasible paths and powerful grips for strengthening talent incentives and optimizing the talent environment from the micro level of enterprises. Based on signal theory, upper echelon and time-oriented theory, this paper takes China's A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2020 as a sample. Talent subsidies are separated from the disclosed government subsidy details and machine learning techniques are used to construct managerial short-termism indicators to empirically test the innovation incentive effect of talent policies and the moderating effect of managerial short-termism on the innovation incentive effect of talent policies. The results show that the talent policy has a strong innovation incentive effect and can effectively promote high-quality innovation of enterprises. However, at the same time, the more short-sighted the manager, the more prominent the inhibitory effect on the innovation incentive effect of talent policy, which means that the enterprise managerial myopia significantly inhibits the innovation incentive effect of talent policy. The above conclusion is still valid after a series of robustness tests, which establishes a theoretical link between macro industrial policy and micro enterprise characteristics, and provides enterprise-level evidence for the optimization and improvement of talent policy; Further heterogeneity analysis from the two dimensions of equity structure and management governance shows that increasing the shareholding ratio and equity balance of supervisory institutional investors, hiring senior executives with financial background and increasing the shareholding ratio of management can effectively alleviate the inhibitory effect of managerial myopia on the innovation incentive effect of talent policy, and provide a path reference for establishing effective self-discipline and external supervision mechanisms from the enterprise level to create a good innovation atmosphere. This paper enriches the research on the relationship between talent policy, managerial myopia and high-quality innovation of enterprises, and has certain practical implications for improving the incentive system and creating a good environment to fully stimulate the vitality of talent innovation, such as continuously increasing talent support, effectively creating a good enterprise innovation environment, and optimizing and improving the level of corporate governance. However, there are still certain shortcomings and limitations in this paper, such as the lack of detailed observation and accurate portrayal of the perception and response of innovative talents to managerial myopia in enterprises, and field research and interviews with innovative talents can be strengthened in the future to enrich the study of the interaction between innovative talents and managers in enterprises. At the same time, in the future, we may try to discuss the support and influence of employee support and organizational atmosphere on innovative talents from a bottom-up perspective, so as to improve and optimize the corporate innovation environment to fully stimulate talents.

Key words: talent policy, managerial myopia, enterprise innovation, incentive effect

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